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No Cap: Analyzing the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Overturn Caps on Non-Economic 
Damages in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd. 
Raymond T. Rhatican* 
ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the state legislature’s 
cap on non-economic damages violated the state constitution’s right to trial by jury. 
In doing so, the Kansas high court overturned its own precedent in Miller v. John-
son, finding that the “inviolate” right to trial by jury is not subject to legislative 
meddling. Kansas also joined several other states, including Missouri, in rejecting 
a strained fact-law distinction employed by most states which uphold such caps in 
the face of right to jury challenges against the backdrop of “inviolate” constitutional 
language. 
 
There is little to no “rational basis” for enacting these caps in the first place. Ac-
cordingly, courts should consider adopting the stronger “rational basis with bite” 
standard of review suggested by Judge Stegall’s Hilburn concurrence, which would 
free courts from adhering to dubious precedent upholding caps on “procedural” 
grounds, and demand that statutes curtailing substantial constitutional rights main-
tain a legitimate connection to public welfare. 
  
 
* Ray Rhatican is a second-year law student at the University of Missouri and an Associate Member of 
the Business, Entrepreneurship, & Tax Law Review. He graduated with a degree in Political Science in 
2018 from the University of Missouri, where he was a fellow with the Kinder Institute on Constitutional 
Democracy. He would like to thank Zach Robinson, Sydney Johnson, Marissa Price, and JoEllen Grohs 
for their immense help throughout the writing process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Louis Brandeis opined in his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ma-
jority opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann that “[i]t is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”1 During the summer of 2019, Kansas re-entered the fray 
of a nationwide debate regarding the constitutionality and economic legitimacy of 
legislative caps on non-economic damages, and distanced itself from a novel and 
controversial approach to legislative damage caps adopted seven years prior.2 Fol-
lowing the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., nine states 
maintain caps on non-economic damages in general tort or personal injury cases, 
nine maintain them in products liability cases, and 24 states maintain them in med-
ical malpractice cases.3 Six states enforce caps on total damages in medical mal-
practice cases.4 In the remainder of states, caps have either not been passed or have 
been found unconstitutional.5 
Damage caps shift an advantage from injured plaintiffs, who are otherwise able 
to obtain full compensation, to insurance companies who reap increased certainty 
and decreased payouts.6 The legitimacy of these caps and their ability to survive 
scrutiny provides serious implications for the business and legal communities.7 
Caps on non-economic damages theoretically affect the rate of premiums offered 
by insurers, impacting their business decisions and bottom line.8 These premiums 
in turn affect the business operations of insureds—such as physicians who may 
avoid certain procedures—otherwise beneficial to society, due to fear of litigation 
and increased premiums.9 The Congressional Budget Office has suggested that 
damage caps in medical malpractice would also indirectly reduce consumer 
healthcare costs by limiting defensive medicine, a practice whereby physicians pre-
scribe excess medical services under the pressure of potential lawsuits.10 The “tort 
reform” initiatives that have ushered in these caps are often justified as a component 
 
 1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 2. See Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019). 
 3. Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY N.Y.C. L. SCH. 
(June 20, 2019), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-sum-
mary#_ftnref5. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Part VI. 
 7. Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The unexpected results of caps on non-economic damages, 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2010), https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/ravraham/unexpected-effects-of-
caps.pdf. 
 8. Kevin McManus, Finding A Cure for High Medical Malpractice Premiums: The Limits of Mis-
souri’s Damage Cap and the Need for Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895, 913–15 (2005). 
 9. “Defensive medicine in simple words is departing from normal medical practice as a safeguard 
from litigation. It occurs when a medical practitioner performs treatment or procedure to avoid exposure 
to malpractice litigation. Defensive medicine is damaging for its potential to poses health risks to the 
patient. Furthermore, it increases the healthcare costs.” M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine: 
A Bane to Healthcare, ANNALS MED. & HEALTH SCI. RES. (2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3728884/. 
 10. Cost Estimate for H.R. 1215, Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 
22, 2017), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52518; See also Sekhar & Vyas, supra note 9. 
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of a pro-business agenda.11 Constitutionality aside, there is debate among legal and 
economic scholars as to whether these caps achieve their stated goal of providing 
certainty to insurers and lower premiums for physicians and consumers.12 The re-
sults are mixed.13 
Part II of this article lays out the legal background to Kansas’ Hilburn decision. 
This background includes discussion of the national landscape concerning damage 
cap jurisprudence, particularly with respect to that of Missouri. Part II also explores 
the justifications underlying Miller v. Johnson, the 2012 case in which Kansas ini-
tially upheld their statutory damage caps.14 Of particular interest in that case is the 
now-abandoned “quid pro quo” approach to Constitutional infringements. Part III 
of this article explores Hilburn in depth and explains the rationale supporting the 
decision. Part IV of this article pays special attention to a controversial “fact-law” 
distinction at the center of most opinions which uphold legislative caps on jury-
determined damages, including the ongoing debate concerning this principle. Part 
V of this article discusses the right to a trial by jury as it existed at common law, 
which is of supreme import in states with constitutions that protect this right as 
“inviolate.” Part VI of this article explores questions presented by the Hilburn de-
cision, including the economic rationale underlying the legislative enactment of 
damage caps. Finally, Part VII of this article provides potential solutions for states 
considering the constitutional validity of legislative damage caps in the wake of 
Hilburn. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Nearly all states that have enacted non-economic damage caps have experi-
enced constitutional challenges to the judicial limitation, most frequently on the 
basis of the right to trial by jury.15 Although § 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights pro-
vides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate,”16 the Kansas legislature 
imposed a statutory cap on non-economic damages in 1988.17 Under this statute, 
recovery by each party for non-economic loss in any personal injury action was 
limited to $250,000, which was to incrementally grow to $350,000 by 2022.18 In 
 
 11. Michelle Andrews, This GOP Health Bill Proposes New Limits To Medical Malpractice Awards  ̧
NPR (JUNE 28, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/06/28/534465478/this-gop-
health-bill-proposes-new-limits-to-medical-malpractice-awards. 
 12. Kelly Kotur, An Extreme Response or A Necessary Reform? Revealing How Caps on Noneco-
nomic Damages Actually Affect Medical Malpractice Victims and Malpractice Insurance Rates, 108 W. 
VA. L. REV. 873, 892–93 (2006). 
 13. Compare H.E. Frech III, An Economic Assessment of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation Imposed by State Laws and the Implications for Federal Policy and Law, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 
693, 695-707 (2006) (explaining how caps reduce incentive to bring lawsuits and should reduce premi-
ums), with Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Malpractice Reform and Employer‐Sponsored Health Insur-
ance Premiums, HEALTH SERV. RES. (2008) (claiming there is “no statistically significant evidence that 
noneconomic damage caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer‐sponsored health 
insurance.”). 
 14. See generally Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012). 
 15. Christopher R. Staley, Comment, Bypassing the Bill of Rights-the Kansas Supreme Court’s Use 
of Quid Pro Quo to Analyze the Inviolate Right to Trial by Jury (Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 
2012)), 53 WASHBURN L.J. 147, 157 (2013). 
 16. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5. 
 17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (West 2018), invalidated by Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 
(Kan. 2019). 
 18. Id. 
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2012, a medical malpractice plaintiff challenged the cap’s constitutionality in Miller 
v. Johnson, under a right to trial by jury theory, pursuant to § 5 of the Kansas Bill 
of Rights.19 The Miller court upheld the cap by extending to § 5 challenges the “quid 
pro quo” test utilized by the court in § 18 right to remedy challenges.20 
Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that “[a]ll persons, for injuries 
suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
and justice administered without delay.”21 The Kansas Supreme Court has repeat-
edly utilized a quid pro quo analysis to allow legislative alteration to a plaintiff’s 
remedy.22 However, unlike § 5, § 18 does not enshrine the right as “inviolate.”23 
The quid pro quo test upholds a judicial limitation imposed by the legislature if it 
satisfies two prongs: (1) as applied, the limitation is reasonably necessary in the 
public interest, and (2) the legislature provides “an adequate substitute remedy” for 
impairment of Constitutional rights.24 In extending the quid pro quo test to chal-
lenges pursuant to the § 5 right to trial by jury, the Miller court held the cap was 
“reasonably necessary to promote the public welfare” because it operates in the 
“broader scheme of mandatory insurance,” and the state has an interest in the avail-
ability and affordability of that insurance.25 This holding rested on the assumption, 
explored below, that damage caps have a meaningful relationship with consumer 
premium costs.26 The court also argued that overturning application of quid pro quo 
would require dismantling the Kansas workers’ compensation and no-fault insur-
ance systems.27 In so holding, Miller determined that, despite the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s consistent determination that § 5 “preserves the jury trial right as it histori-
cally existed at common law” at the time of the Kansas Constitution’s ratification,28 
the “inviolate” right to a trial by jury is not inviolate, but instead subject to subse-
quent legislative modification.29 The right to jury trial as it existed at common law 
and the legislature’s ability to alter the common law are more directly taken up 
below.30 
Miller’s extension of quid pro quo analysis to the right to trial by jury was 
controversial.31 Kansas Supreme Court Judge Carol Beier’s concurring opinion in 
Miller refused to adopt the majority’s constitutional analysis and “mystifying” ap-
plication of quid pro quo to justify an abridgement of a constitutional right, stating 
her desire to “kick [quid pro quo] to the curb where it always belonged.”32 Curi-
ously, Kansas had distinguished itself prior to Hilburn as the only state to approach 
 
 19. See generally Miller, 289 P.3d at 1106. 
 20. Id. at 1113. 
 21. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18. 
 22. See., e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990) (“Due process 
requires that the legislature substitute the viable statutory remedy of quid pro quo (this for that) to replace 
the loss of the right.”). 
 23. Compare KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5, with KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18. 
 24. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 512 (Kan. 2019). 
 25. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1114. 
 26. See infra Part VI.. 
 27. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1144 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 28. Id. at 1108 (majority opinion). 
 29. Id. at 1110 (“The decisions of this court are replete with instances of common-law rights being 
modified or abolished.” (quoting Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.3d 1291, 1301 (Kan. 1974))). 
 30. See infra Part V. 
 31. Staley, supra note 15, at 175 (“[T]he court’s reliance on the quid pro quo analysis to a right to trial 
by jury challenge was flawed.”). 
 32. Miller, 239 P.3d at 1132 (Beier, J., concurring); Id. at 1138. 
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caps with a quid pro quo inquiry regarding constitutionality.33 Although Justice 
Brandeis once acknowledged that “[d]enial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the nation,”34 commentators suggested in the 
aftermath of Miller that perhaps Kansas should have looked to its neighbors for 
guidance.35 
Months before the Miller decision, the Missouri Supreme Court also addressed 
a constitutional challenge to statutory damage caps, and returned a verdict contrary 
to that of its western neighbor by finding the cap unconstitutional.36 The court, also 
analyzing constitutional language enshrining the right to trial by jury as “invio-
late,”37 determined that the cap at issue “directly curtails the jury’s determination of 
damages and, as a result, necessarily infringes on the right to trial by jury.”38 
III. THE HILBURN DECISION 
Seven years after Miller, Judge Beier was able to pen the majority opinion in 
Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., a landmark 2019 case overturning Kansas Supreme Court 
precedent and invalidating the legislature’s 1988 cap as unconstitutional.39 Hilburn 
was decided against the backdrop of a recently tempered presumption of statutory 
constitutionality with regard to “fundamental interests.”40 This foundational change 
in Kansas jurisprudence eroded the Miller court’s justification in relying heavily on 
stare decisis in upholding the cap,41 which validated Judge Beier’s qualms with the 
Miller decision and paved the way to the cap’s demise.42 The Hilburn majority, 
acknowledging this changed landscape, held that “in such cases, the presumption 
of constitutionality does not apply.”43 
Without upsetting the use of quid pro quo analysis in § 18 challenges,44 the 
Hilburn court overturned Miller’s holding that this analysis could be extended to § 
5 without running afoul of the Kansas Constitution and the “inviolate” status of the 
right to trial by jury.45 In doing so, Hilburn held that § 5 provides more than a right 
 
 33. Staley, supra note 15, at 173 (“The Kansas Supreme Court is the only state supreme court in the 
United States to apply a quid pro quo test in determining whether a noneconomic damages cap violates 
the right to trial by jury.”). 
 34. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandies, J., dissenting). 
 35. Staley, supra note 15, at 173. 
 36. See Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs, 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 37. Id. at 637 (citing MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a)). 
 38. Id. at 640. 
 39. See generally Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019). 
 40. See generally Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 499 (Kan. 2019) (“A more stringent test 
has emerged, however, in cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or ‘fundamental interests.’” (quoting 
State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221, 227 (Kan. 1978))). 
 41. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 519 (“The Miller majority also asserted that the cost-benefit analysis involved 
in evaluating the wisdom of following precedent favored application of a quid pro quo test to analysis 
of section 5 claims.”). 
 42. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1141–44 (Kan. 2012) (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 43. See Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 513. 
 44. Appellate Court Digests, KAN. B. ASS’N (June 14, 2019), https://www.ksbar.org/blog-
post/1618780/326236/June-14-2019-Digests (“The section 5 right to jury trial is completely distinct 
from the section 18 right to remedy. A statutory cap substitutes the legislature’s nonspecific judgment 
for a jury’s specific judgment. This runs afoul of the constitution’s grant of an “inviolate” right to a 
jury.”). 
 45. See Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 514. 
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to empanel a jury.46 The court cited Beier’s Miller concurrence in finding that the 
Kansas Constitution placed the right to a jury determination of damages “beyond 
everyday legislative meddling. The people entrusted juries with the task of deciding 
damages.”47 In effect, the Kansas Supreme Court distanced itself from its reliance 
on the fact-law distinction in Miller.48 Hilburn rejected the Attorney General’s ar-
gument that the court should follow the lead of the majority of other states, such as 
Virginia,49 which have upheld their caps on the basis of a rather technical fact-law 
distinction.50 Instead, unlike in Miller, the Hilburn court was persuaded by the Kan-
sas Constitution’s protection of the right to trial by jury as “inviolate.”51 As a result, 
Hilburn determined that the disturbance of the jury’s finding of fact with regard to 
the amount of the award was an impermissible encroachment on the jury’s obliga-
tion to determine damages and ran afoul of § 5.52 Specifically, Hilburn took issue 
with the suggestion that the legislature’s “general” determination could be an ade-
quate substitute for the “specific” determination of a jury.53 For this encroachment 
on the inviolate right to a trial by jury, Hilburn found the legislature’s cap on non-
economic damages facially unconstitutional.54 
It is important to note that the Hilburn decision did not overturn the cap in 
actions for wrongful death or punitive damages.55 Although the opinion does not 
expressly state this exception, the court’s § 5 analysis is couched in preserving the 
right to trial by jury as it existed at the time the Kansas Constitution was ratified in 
1859.56 The Kansas Supreme Court has “consistently held that the determination of 
noneconomic damages” fits this criteria.57 The statute providing a cause of action 
for wrongful death, for example, was not passed until 1963,58 and though the legis-
lature has the power to alter the common law with enactments such as that providing 
for wrongful death suits, it may not modify that which has been granted 
 
 46. Id. at 515 (“Giving the jury ‘a practically meaningless opportunity to assess damages simply ‘pays 
lip service to the form of the jury but robs it of its function.’” (quoting Miller, 289 P.3d. at 1136)). 
 47. Id. at 516. 
 48. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1136 (“Rather than stating in a straightforward way that K.S.A. 60–19a02 does 
impair the Section 5 right to jury trial, the majority feints toward then-Justice Kay McFarland’s position 
in her concurrence in Samsel II that the right to jury trial does not extend to the remedy phase of trial.”). 
 49. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521. 
 50. Id. at 521–24 (“For example, in Virginia, the Supreme Court has said, ‘The resolution of disputed 
facts continues to be a jury’s sole function. ‘The province of the jury is to settle questions of fact, and 
when the facts are ascertained the law determines the rights of the parties.’ Thus, the Virginia Constitu-
tion guarantees only that a jury will resolve disputed facts.”). 
 51. Id. at 523 (“[W]e simply cannot square a right specially designated by the people as ‘inviolate’ 
with the practical effect of the damages cap: substituting juries’ factual determinations of actual damages 
with an across-the-board legislative determination of the maximum conceivable amount of actual dam-
ages.”). 
 52. Id. at 524. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 514; Chris Tillery, Kansas Supreme Court Overturns Statutory Cap On “Pain and Suffer-
ing” And Other Noneconomic Damages In Personal Injury Cases, SEIGFREID BINGHAM, http://www.sb-
kc.com/news/2019/06/kansas-supreme-court-overturns-statutory-cap-on-pain-and-suffering-and-other-
noneconomic-damages-in-personal-injury-cases/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
 56. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 514. 
 57. Id. 
 58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (West 2018), invalidated by Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 
(Kan. 2019). 
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constitutional protections, as was the existing Kansas common law upon ratification 
of the Kansas constitution.59 
IV. THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION 
When reviewing the reasoning in the Miller and Hilburn decisions, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the now-abrogated quid pro quo approach to § 5 was 
unique to Kansas’ constitutional jurisprudence.60 Most courts take a different ana-
lytical path.61 As the majority in Hilburn acknowledges, “[t]he fact-law or fact-pol-
icy distinction has been relied on in varying degrees by almost all courts that have 
upheld damages caps in the face of jury trial-based challenges.”62 
Courts upholding caps on the basis of the fact-law distinction find that the “trial 
court’s application of law to the facts” as found by a jury does not impede a plain-
tiff’s right to a trial by jury.63 In her dissent in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Cen-
ters, the Missouri Supreme Court case that overturned Missouri’s caps, Judge Mary 
Rhodes Russell argued that the cap merely represented the “substantive legal limits 
of a plaintiff’s damage remedy,” and the cap was, therefore, an appropriate legisla-
tive activity regarding a matter of law, as opposed to a matter of fact safely within 
the jury’s discretion and the protection of the right to trial by jury.64 This dissent 
followed Missouri precedent prior to the Watts decision, which upheld caps under 
the theory that the jury performed its proper role in assessing damages, and “[o]nly 
after the jury had performed its constitutional fact-finding duty would the court ap-
ply the substantive law (e.g., damage caps) to those facts.”65 As Russell saw it, once 
the jury had determined the fact of damages, it had “completed its constitutional 
task,” and it fell to the court to apply the law.66 This argument is perhaps at its most 
extreme in finding “the jury serves no function other than providing an individual 
his right to a trial by jury,” and that the cap does not prevent the jury from “assessing 
damages,” only from awarding them.67 Russell cited the reasoning of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, which found that “[s]o long as the 
fact-finding process is not intruded upon and the resulting findings of fact are not 
ignored or replaced by another body’s findings, awards may be altered as a matter 
of law.”68 
 
 59. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516; accord Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 554 (Mo. banc 2016) 
(“Sanders court recognized that wrongful death is a purely statutory cause of action that did not exist at 
common law. As a result, ‘the legislature has the authority to choose what remedies will be permitted’ 
because it created the cause of action.”). 
 60. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521 (“[L]ooking beyond our state borders, we note that, at the time Miller 
was decided, 19 states had addressed whether damages caps violated their state’s constitutional jury 
protections, and not one had employed the quid pro quo test in its analysis.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 521-22. 
 63. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 649 (Mo. banc 2012) (Russell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 64. Id. 
 65. David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury Trial and the 
Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 109, 117 
(2013). 
 66. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 649. 
 67. Id. at 650. 
 68. Id. at 651 (citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 431 (Ohio 2007)). 
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Despite the reliance on this distinction by most states upholding legislative caps 
against “inviolate” right to trial by jury challenges,69 the Watts majority refused to 
use this distinction to curtail a plaintiff’s right to a jury’s full and fair determination 
of damages,70 citing a long recognition in Missouri that finding damages is amongst 
the jury’s primary duties.71 The legislative cap’s “wholly independent” operation 
from the facts rendered it directly at odds with a jury finding of damages.72 As a 
result, the cap “necessarily infringes” on the right to a trial by jury,73 a right that is 
“substantial and valuable” and should be “carefully guarded against infringe-
ments.”74 To hold otherwise “would make constitutional protections of only theo-
retical value—they would exist only unless and until limited by the legislature.”75 
Despite acknowledging the “historical applicability of Section 5 to common-
law tort actions,” and that “the right of trial by jury shall be and remain as ample 
and complete as it was at the time when the constitution was adopted,”76 Kansas’ 
Miller majority reached the conclusion that legislative prerogative and availability 
of a substitute remedy excused an encroachment on the jury’s determination as it 
existed at common law.77 It was this point in particular that alienated Judge Beier.78 
Judge Stegall’s concurring opinion in Hilburn expressed his view that the fact-
law distinction deserved more attention in the court’s analysis.79 His opinion 
acknowledged an “oblique” reference by the attorney general that a principal ques-
tion to be addressed is whether the imposition of a cap on non-economic damages 
is substantive or procedural.80 Stegall found that the legislature’s insistence that the 
jury not be advised of the cap indicated an attempt to effect a “procedural interfer-
ence with the inviolate right to a jury protected by section 5,”81 as opposed to a 
substantive modification of the cause of action.82 This action impermissibly substi-
tuted the legislature’s judgment for that of the jury.83 In doing so, the legislature 
“changed who decides, not what is being decided.”84 Had the legislature instead 
effected a substantive change, the enactment would have been subject to the more 
permissive § 18 “right to remedy” analysis.85 
 
 69. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 522 (Kan. 2019). 
 70. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 640 (majority opinion). 
 71. Id. at 639. 
 72. Id. at 640. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 513. 
 75. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 643. 
 76. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1137 (Kan. 2012) (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting the majority’s concession toward the viability of the right to trial by jury). 
 77. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521 (citing the majority holding in Miller, 289 P.3d at 1117–18). 
 78. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1136 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is after its agree-
ment on these two irrefutable points that the majority first goes astray.”). 
 79. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 526 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 80. Id. at 525. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 526. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 525. 
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V. RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 
Hilburn held that § 5 preserves the right to trial by jury as it existed at common 
law at the time of constitutional ratification.86 A “fundamental” component of this 
right included the determination of non-economic damages.87 The court found this 
right could not remain “inviolate” so long as an aggrieved plaintiff is not afforded 
“the jury’s constitutionally assigned role of determining damages.”88 The majority 
found company in a like-minded Missouri Supreme Court, which held that giving 
the jury a “practically meaningless opportunity” to assess damages merely “pays lip 
service to the form of the jury but robs it of its function.”89 Instead, Kansans en-
shrined inflexible protection of the right to a trial by jury in their state constitution 
because “the people recognized the right to jury trial required protection from leg-
islative efforts to modify it in ways that destroy the substance of that right.”90 
Despite agreeing “as a purely technical, theoretical matter” that legislatively 
applying a damage cap to a jury finding of factual damages is a matter of law, Hil-
burn held that the effect of this application is to improperly assign the determination 
of damages to someone or something other than the jury, whom the people of Kan-
sas selected for this task in ratifying the Kansas Constitution.91 Furthermore, alt-
hough the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has not been incorporated 
to the states,92 Hilburn cited U.S. Supreme Court authority that more jury deference 
is to be afforded in the case of non-economic damages due to their less certain na-
ture.93 
Courts in states like Kansas are quick to recognize that legislatures have the 
power to alter the common law,94 including the right to a jury assessment of dam-
ages.95 To hold otherwise would severely curtail a legislature’s power to enact or 
alter laws.96 Despite this legislative authority, Hilburn adeptly pointed out the “fun-
damental” distinction between mere rights at common law, and the special class of 
common law rights that were specifically granted protection by the Kansas Consti-
tution.97 Hilburn cited the U.S. Supreme Court in finding the common law is typi-
cally flexible, but not in cases of constitutional protection of the right as it existed 
upon enshrinement.98 In such cases, the court “is dealing with a constitutional pro-
vision that has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by 
jury, as those rules existed” at the time of constitutional ratification.99 An alteration 
 
 86. Id. at 514 (majority opinion). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 514–15. 
 89. Id. at 515 (quoting Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs, 376 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Mo. banc 2012)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 523. 
 92. Id. (“United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Seventh Amendment’s scope in civil tri-
als, while not binding on the states, also provides some insight.”). 
 93. Id. at 523–24 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474, 479 (1935)). 
 94. Id. at 525 (Stegall, J., concurring). 
 95. Maron, supra note 65, at 119 (“It follows that the power to abolish causes of action includes the 
power to abolish causes of action for damages in amounts of above the statutory limit.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516 (majority opinion). 
 98. Id. (citing Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935)). 
 99. Id. 
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of these rules is in fact not an alteration of the common law, but of the constitution 
itself.100 
In overturning Missouri’s cap, the Watts court determined that the “heretofore 
enjoyed” language of Missouri’s constitution provided an entitlement to a jury trial 
“in actions to which they would have been entitled to a jury when the Missouri 
Constitution was adopted.”101 The court found that statutory caps on damages 
“simply did not exist and were not contemplated by the common law” when Mis-
sourians ratified their constitution.102 As a result, the right to a jury “as heretofore 
enjoyed” is not subject to legislative limits on jury-determined damages.103 Hilburn 
cited Watts and like-minded states extensively in determining that “[g]iving the leg-
islature the authority to limit damages by changing the common law, or otherwise, 
violates § 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights by taking the damage question away from 
the jury.”104 
VI. QUESTIONING THE CAP’S PURPOSE 
Following this decision, one may reasonably expect a sizable economic effect 
on consumers as insurance carriers brace for uncertainty and potentially massive 
judgments.105 Following the opinion in Hilburn, many commentators predicted the 
worst, suggesting “the ruling will open the floodgates to high-dollar lawsuits that 
will drive up the cost of care for everyone.”106 Others lamented that the cap had 
“been effective in keeping costs down for small business owners” and produced a 
more favorable legal climate than Missouri, where a lack of caps “affected patient 
care and business costs.”107 
Nevertheless, the research on this issue is largely nonconclusive and filled with 
cherry-picked data that is often unreliable.108 On one hand, some economic scholars 
argue that “[e]conomic principles, markets, and the results of empirical research 
indicate caps are effective in reducing medical liability insurance costs, thereby re-
ducing health care costs.”109 The limited size of possible judgments reduces the in-
centive to bring lawsuits for personal injury and medical malpractice, promoting 
judicial economy.110 For example, modeling suggests a non-economic damage cap 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State ex 
rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003)). 
 102. Id. at 639. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516 (quoting Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 562 
(1990) (Herd, J., dissenting)). 
 105. Andy Marso, Kansas Patients Can Now Win Big in Doctor Malpractice Suits, CLAIMS J. (July 11, 
2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/midwest/2019/07/11/291924.htm (“The Kansas Medical 
Society, which represents doctors, said the state ‘has enjoyed a stable medical malpractice environment 
for many years’ but that was about to change thanks to the ‘unfortunate and costly decision by the 
court.’”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. John Breslin, Business leaders bothered by Kansas Supreme Court’s ‘awful’ decision to remove 
cap on damages, LEGAL NEWSLINE (June 28, 2019), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/512673594-busi-
ness-leaders-bothered-by-kansas-supreme-court-s-awful-decision-to-remove-cap-on-damages. 
 108. Francisco F. Guzman Andrade, Comment, Tort Reform—How the Phrase “As Heretofore En-
joyed” Subjected Wrongful Death Plaintiffs to Noneconomic Damages Caps in Missouri, 70 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 983, 987 n.30 (2018) (analyzing Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542 (Mo. banc 2016)). 
 109. Frech III, supra note 13, at 696. 
 110. Id. 
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of $250,000 may actually provide a medical malpractice plaintiff, such as that in 
Hilburn, with a negative expected recovery when considering the astronomical cost 
of pursuing the litigation.111 On the other hand, despite the diminished incentives, 
caps do not seem to have a practical effect on judicial efficiency, as “[d]amage lim-
its do not significantly reduce the number of lawsuits filed.”112 
In addition to judicial economy, legislatures have the effect on insurers and 
consumers in mind when enacting caps.113 As above, the efficacy of caps in achiev-
ing this goal is unclear. Although modeling suggests caps “should” reduce insur-
ance premiums,114 this is not certain in practice. For example, despite surviving a 
pair of constitutional challenges in 1985,115 California’s cap on non-economic dam-
ages failed to prevent climbing insurance rates.116 Scholars suggest that a meaning-
ful correlation between damage caps and insurance premiums is hard to come by.117 
The lack of empirical consensus that caps keep costs down in exchange for the ex-
treme burden placed on victims is of grave concern, as ineffective legislation would 
mean that “insurance companies reap increased profits through windfall legislation 
that reduces their exposure, while the pain and disability of malpractice victims 
persists uncapped.”118 
Many criticize the practice of imposing these caps in pursuit of the elusive goal 
of lowering premiums, as “damage caps, as currently implemented in the United 
States, are an ineffective means of resolving the medical malpractice crises that re-
peatedly plague the insurance system.”119 As another example of the failure of caps 
on non-economic damages to reign in soaring insurance premiums, between 2002 
and 2003, Missouri saw a precipitous decline in non-economic damage awards 
reaching the state’s cap, with a record low of five judgments in 2003 as well as a 
reduction in the amount of economic damage awards exceeding $1 million.120 De-
spite the falling payouts, “medical malpractice insurance premiums doubled, rising 
from $113.5 to $227 million,” a record high.121 Former Missouri Insurance Director 
Jay Angoff found that the 15 largest medical malpractice insurers nationwide dou-
bled their premiums from 2000 through 2004, despite an unremarkable change in 
payouts.122 
The now-abrogated Miller decision, which upheld caps in Kansas just months 
following Missouri’s invalidation of the same,123 allowed for a post-Watts and pre-
 
 111. Id. at 700. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Frank A. Perrecone & Lisa R. Fabiano, The Fleecing of Seriously Injured Medical Malpractice 
Victims in Illinois, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006); McManus, supra note 8, at 905. 
 114. Frech III, supra note 13, at 706-07 (“Imposing caps on the states which currently do not have them 
would have reduced loss payments in 2004 by approximately $251 million.”). 
 115. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (1985); Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 
665, 683 (1985). 
 116. Kotur, supra note 12. 
 117. Morrisey, supra note 13, at 2124 (“No statistically significant evidence that noneconomic damage 
caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer‐sponsored health insurance”). 
 118. Perrecone & Fabiano, supra note 114, at 531. 
 119. Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage 
Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006). 
 120. McManus, supra note 8, at 912–13. 
 121. Id. at 913. 
 122. Perrecone & Fabiano, supra note 114, at 534. 
 123. See generally Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012). 
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Hilburn period of comparison between Kansas and Missouri.124 Although Missouri 
payouts exceeded those in Kansas between 2017 and 2018, Kansas’ increase 
tracked the national average, while Missouri’s increase was only 1% higher.125 
The cap-imposed limitation on damages recoverable by aggrieved medical 
malpractice plaintiffs, combined with the substantially increased burden felt by phy-
sicians, calls into question who actually benefitted from the cap’s protection. De-
spite the encroachment upon their right to trial by jury, plaintiffs have not reaped 
the benefit of these caps, even with assurances that this legislative limitation on 
potential judicial remedies would reduce the burden of insurance premiums.126 Nor 
have physicians benefitted,127 in spite of the promise of lower premiums for medical 
malpractice insurance and a resulting improvement of the quality of healthcare.128 
Some argue this tort reform has done more harm than good: 
the burden of this type of legislation “falls exclusively on those extremely 
unfortunate victims” who suffer the most serious and catastrophic injuries. 
A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a limited amount has not received 
full compensation for their injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbi-
trarily, caps the recovery at a lesser amount than their actual damages, 
without any tangible benefit to consumers.129 
Moreover, this impact may be disproportionately borne by those who can least af-
ford it.130 This data and lack of foundational support for the notion that public eco-
nomic interests are served by the imposition of damage caps undercuts their sup-
posed purpose and calls into question whether such legislation should enjoy exten-
sive deference and technical justification from the judiciary. 
VII. TAKE A “BITE” OUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENTS 
The above suggests that insurance companies have reaped a great benefit from 
state courts upholding legislative damage caps. The tenuous fact-law (or proce-
dural-substantive) distinction rests on strained logic and results in extreme hardship 
for seriously injured victims, without consequent relief for physicians and other in-
sureds. Missouri and Kansas, among others, have at last curtailed this reasoning and 
restored the promise of “inviolate” protection of the right to trial by jury. The 
 
 124. Stephen R. Clark, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: Missouri and Kansas Supreme Court 
Decisions on the Constitutionality of Caps on Noneconomic Damages Demonstrate the Need for Objec-
tive Procedures in the Selection of Special Judges, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (2014) (“The now-stark 
difference between the two states will provide an interesting laboratory for studying the effects of non-
economic damages caps in medical malpractice cases on plaintiffs, defendants, medical professionals, 
insurance providers, and the judiciary.”). 
 125. Lily Lieberman, Kansas, Missouri medical malpractice payouts total $78.2M in 2018, KANSAS 
CITY BUSINESS JOURNAL (April 4, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansas-
city/news/2019/04/04/kansas-missouri-medical-malpractice-payouts-2018.html. 
 126. See Frech III, supra note 13, at 693 
 127. McNamus, supra note 121, at 913. 
 128. Kotur, supra note 12, at 893 ( “The justification for caps on noneconomic damages is to reduce 
the cost of medical malpractice insurance, which in turn will retain doctors in the state and strengthen 
the quality of healthcare available in the state.”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 897 (“Reforms in Texas ‘slammed the courthouse doors shut on those who can least afford 
it - children, stay-at-home moms and the elderly’”). 
12
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 49
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss1/49
No. 1] Rhatican: Hilburn and Non-Economic Damage Caps 209 
several states still using this logic to maintain a legislative cap regime, especially 
those interpreting constitutions containing “inviolate” or similar language, should 
look to the reasoning of Watts and Hilburn. After years of experimentation, the re-
sults have shown that cap proponents’ fears of astronomical judgments and frivo-
lous lawsuits causing premium spikes were misplaced: the premiums rose anyway. 
The dubious nature of caps’ effect on rising premiums also raises questions 
regarding statutory presumptions of validity and rational basis review. As discussed 
above, Hilburn was decided in the context of a weakened presumption of statutory 
validity regarding fundamental constitutional interests.131 With respect to those fun-
damental constitutional interests, the presumption of constitutionality no longer ap-
plies.132 While Miller held that legislative enactments such as caps are subject to 
“rational basis” or clear error review,133 it is clear that abridgments of constitution-
ally protected rights should be scrutinized for more than “whether a statutory clas-
sification bears some rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose.”134 In his 
concurring opinion in Hilburn, Judge Stegall highlighted the dispositive nature of 
standard of review to his own analysis of the case.135 He wrote that he was “content, 
at present, to abandon our clear error standard of review in favor of de novo review 
in this case, as set forth by the majority,”136 and suggested that Kansas courts should 
do so when any portion of the Kansas Constitution is implicated.137 In arguing that 
Kansas should dispel with clear error review regarding enactments affecting consti-
tutional rights, Judge Stegall discussed “rational basis with bite” review of legisla-
tive enactments.138 He also questioned, while postponing an answer, whether Kan-
sas courts should have a mandate to deem statutes unconstitutional when their con-
stitutional violation is not clear “beyond a reasonable doubt.”139 
In due process challenges to statutes, most states undergo rational basis analy-
sis, which involves an assessment of the reasonableness of a given statute.140 In-
cluded in this reasonableness inquiry is an assessment of “the social and economic 
conditions that existed when the statute was enacted or at the time the case was 
decided.”141 Judge Stegall explained this was an appropriate analysis to undergo 
regarding the Hilburn § 5 challenge.142 As a piece of “economic legislation,” the 
damage cap is properly subject to rational basis review in that it must rationally 
relate to a “valid legislative purpose.”143 Under this standard, a court must analyze 
 
 131. Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d at 499 (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 
610 (Kan. 1978)) (“A more stringent test has emerged, however, in cases involving ‘suspect classifica-
tions’ or ‘fundamental interests.’”). 
 132. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 513 (2019). 
 133. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d at 1119. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 52 (Steagall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 136. Id. at 527. 
 137. Id. (“Perhaps courts should exercise de novo review over Kansas statutes when any portion of our 
Constitution is implicated, not only when judicially favored rights are involved.”). 
 138. Id. at 529; see also Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d at 550 (“Contrary to modern notions of 
‘rational basis’ review, the judicial inquiry demanded by section 1 would look to the actual legislative 
record rather than to hypothetical reasons or any possible imagined rationale. The test has occasionally 
been described as ‘rational basis with bite.’”). 
 139. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 528. 
 140. Maron, supra note 65, at 126. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 529. 
 143. Clark, supra note 125, at 1449. 
13
Rhatican: No Cap: Analyzing the Kansas Supreme Court’s Decision to Overturn
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
210 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 4 2020 
the actual purpose of the legislature in enacting a given statute.144 However, sub-
stantial deference is still required, and it can be difficult to strike down a statute 
such as a damage cap even when the apparent purpose—such as lowering premiums 
or healthcare costs—is dubious.145 
In Miller, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the cap passed muster under 
rational basis review, finding it “reasonably conceivable” that the cap furthered “the 
objective of reducing and stabilizing insurance premiums by providing predictabil-
ity and eliminating the possibility of large noneconomic damage awards.”146 As a 
result of this type of analysis, damage caps survive in many states despite courts 
remaining “unconvinced of the wisdom of limiting quality of life damages for se-
verely injured victims.”147 Judge Stegall tacitly suggests “rational basis with bite,” 
a standard under which “[i]n order to be a constitutional exercise of power, every act 
of our Legislature must be rationally related to the furtherance or protection of the 
commonwealth.”148 Given that the legislature does not have constitutional authority 
to “act in arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory ways,” and that a “rational basis 
with bite” standard would entail a hard inquiry into the true purpose of an enact-
ment, Judge Stegall arguably opens the door to an economic analysis of whether 
faulty economic platitudes may justify the invalidation of statutes curtailing consti-
tutional rights.149 
This heightened scrutiny applied to statutes curtailing substantial rights af-
forded by constitutional protection would disallow such dubious economic legisla-
tion as the caps enacted by the Kansas legislature, with the stated purpose of low-
ering premiums for consumers and healthcare providers. This legitimate purpose 
review could ensure that legislation is rational and non-arbitrary and does not dis-
criminate against the most vulnerable.150 Such a standard could obviate the need for 
courts to undergo painstaking analysis of the technical and theoretical differences 
between substantive and procedural functions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas Supreme Court boldly overturned precedent only seven years old 
in its landmark decision in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., finding that its previous deci-
sion in Miller v. Johnson rested on weak foundation. Specifically, the Hilburn ma-
jority found that quid pro quo was an insufficient replacement for a constitutionally 
guaranteed “inviolate” right to a trial by jury, and although the legislature has the 
right to alter the common law, this prerogative does not extend to rights at common 
law that have been enshrined in the Kansas Constitution as they existed on the date 
 
 144. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 529. 
 145. Maron, supra note 65, at 130, quoting Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004) (“The court 
noted that ‘the empirical truth of these findings is a matter of some dispute’ and it was ‘unconvinced of 
the wisdom of limiting quality of life damages for severely injured victims.’ But because the issue was 
fairly debatable, the court could not conclude that ‘the legislature [had] overstepped its constitutional 
bounds when it determined that there was a crisis needing a remedy.’”). 
 146. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (2012). 
 147. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 140 (Utah 2004). 
 148. Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 551 (2019) (Stegall, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. (“Applying the necessary deference, a court must examine the actual legislative record to de-
termine the real purpose behind any law in question before it can conclude the law is within the limited 
constitutional grant of power possessed by the State.”). 
 150. Kotur, supra note 12, at 897. 
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of ratification. The “fact-law” distinction relied on by Miller and the majority of 
courts upholding caps on non-economic damages was appropriately discarded as 
legitimate in theory and technicality alone. Hilburn held that stare decisis and pre-
sumptions of statutory validity do not pave the way for the legislature to curtail 
fundamental constitutional rights. Further, Judge Stegall’s dissenting opinion sug-
gests a more appropriate standard of review for constitutional challenges of this 
nature, “rational basis with bite.” Under this standard, courts would be free to assess 
economic legitimacy in finding whether an enactment bears a reasonable relation to 
the public welfare, and if not, would be able to invalidate the enactment on this 
basis alone. 
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